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IT´S JUST ROCKET SCIENCE, NOT PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
Mikkel Vangsgaard1 and Christian Thuesen2 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an inductive, empirically based research on the Danish non-profit voluntary 
space association Copenhagen Suborbitals. The purpose was to execute a qualitative constructivist 
grounded theory study to discover and explain the behavior and operation of the case subject. Based on 
this, grounded theory methodology was found highly adequate, as it allowed an investigation without 
predetermined hypotheses, specific research questions, and a theoretical framework. The central 
question was: What are they actually doing? Therefore, prior to the study, the researcher formed no 
specific expectations or demands, and thus, the research could develop in either way. The primary data 
collection involved observations, open interviews, and conversations. Observations of meetings and 
conducted work at the organizational location enabled the study of participants who acted in their 
natural environment, while interviews and conversations enabled a source of more concentrated and 
direct information. Secondary data was also collected, which primarily consisted of an extensive 
research of web-blog posts from the study subject. Primarily based on the primary data the grounded 
theories were developed. Subsequently to the analysis, the study was contextualized with literature to 
identify the academic relations. The study showed that the subject had successfully integrated the 
concepts of consensus and initiative, and achieved an organizational form that, at one level promoted 
member unity and collective steering, and at another level encouraged individual initiative. The 
association rejected hierarchy, and thus the executive coalition involved all members. Moreover, the 
study discovered two distinctive operational processes: (1) direction, established a flexible 
organizational heading, and (2) navigation, allowed liberated groups to develop accordingly, but 
ensured that evaluation and coordination was done in collectivity. The processes of direction and 
navigation were congruent with well-known methods of trial-and-error and parallel trails, and based on 
iterative processes and learning by doing. Unexpectedly the research evolved to support contemporary 
claims that the practice of project management has forgotten these values, and that intuitive and 
alternative methods should be accepted as viable project management.  
 
KEYWORDS: Grounded theory, project organizing, rethinking project management, 
consensus vs. initiative.   
 
  
                                                
 
1 MSc candidate, Department of Management Engineering, Technical University of Denmark, 
mikkelvangsgaard@gmail.com 
2 Associate Professor, Department of Management Engineering, Technical University of Denmark, chth@dtu.dk 
Proceedings – EPOC 2015 Conference 
2 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“The probability of success is difficult to estimate; but if we never search, 
the chance of success is zero.” Cocconi and Morrison, 1959. 
 
On July 20th 1969, Neil Armstrong took a famous step; a step that defined a giant leap for 
mankind, and set a milestone in the human aspiration to explore and understand our existence. 
Furthermore, he confirmed the American success in their competition with the Russians, in what is 
commonly known as the space race. The famous step by Armstrong was also the climax of uncountable 
interconnected projects performed, executed, and managed by the American NASA (the National 
Aeronautics & Space Association). 
Originally, project management trails back to the development of nuclear missiles in the 1950s. 
Back then, project management was a practice of coping with contingent and complex propositions, 
and early projects accepted risk and unforeseeable development as a part of the chance for success. In 
the early 1960s, the newly formed NASA, along with other significant institutions, adopted the 
discipline of project management in its operation. However, NASA facilitated a more analytical and 
process oriented approach than the original projects. Since then, the discipline has been extensively 
discussed, and the practice as we know it today has been subject to continuous development and 
standardization. In recent years, the emphasis has especially become devoted to optimization of certain 
constraints: Scope, cost, and time; and some contemporary researchers claim that the discipline 
inadequately neglects the original methods. 
This paper is an extraction from a thesis at the Technical University of Denmark, Department of 
Management Engineering, and presents of study of Copenhagen Suborbitals (CS). CS is a volunteer 
based non-profit association aspiring to send a man into space in a homemade rocket – The world’s 
only amateur space program; instantly the case raises questions of how and why. By developing 
comprehensive rocket technology in a hobby-association, CS challenges the common notion that rocket 
science is entitled the brightest minds on the planet.  
As the case subject was perceived as special, and potentially interesting in many different 
directions, the study approach was chosen as inductive and empirical, and the methodology as 
grounded theory. With grounded theory there were neither hypotheses nor extant theory to be tested in 
the study.  Hence, going into the research anything could happen and I, as a researcher, did not know 
what to expect from the result. The purpose was to discover: What was actually going on in CS, and to 
develop theoretic and abstract explication of the subject behavior. In grounded theory, “If you offer a 
fresh or deeper understanding of the studied phenomena, you can make an original contribution” 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 153). Furthermore, in order to raise the academic level and to create influence, a 
literature review was conducted subsequently to the analysis, which enabled a succeeding discussion 
and contextualization. 
As the thesis implements the discipline of grounded theory, it offers an untraditional 
development of research data and thus an unconventional paper structure. The study is presented in 
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chronological order congruent to the actual research progression: Data, literature, and context. 
Accordingly, due to the development, the actual findings, study influence, and context is not discovered 
until the final chapters. However, to maintain your interest, I can reveal that the study actually 
identified more issues related to the practice of management than rocket science; for that reason the 
provocative title. Moreover, the literature review led to some unexpected findings and connections 
between the studied behavior and contemporary claims of project management. 
The paper opens with a description of the research methodology, followed by a story setting the 
scene for the subsequent analysis where the grounded theories are developed. The developed theories 
are finally contextualized through the literature review and subsequent discussion and conclusion. 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Philosophy 
Glaser and Strauss introduced grounded theory in the 1960s, and the philosophy behind the 
methodology has evolved ever since; even the founders diverted into different basic principles. The 
philosophical foundation for this particular research was constructivism. “A constructivist approach 
places priority on the phenomena of study and sees both data and analysis as created from shared 
experiences and relationships with participants” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 130). Therefore, data was not 
understood as factual reality, but as sources’ interpretations of their reality in Copenhagen Suborbitals. 
Furthermore, it is acknowledged that data also is interpreted by me, thus running the risk of potentially 
biasing the analysis with the background within engineering management. According to Charmaz 
(2006), constructivists are aware that pre-assumptions may affect the research, and they attempt to 
define the affects hereof. Constructivist grounded theorists are placed in a reality where they have to 
balance empirical findings with their extant knowledge (Suddaby, 2006). In relation to the origin of the 
methodology, constructivist grounded theory is furthermost similar to the principles of Strauss and his 
later companion Corbin. They define theory as abstract and as emerged through series of interpretations 
that undeniably is affected by the interpreter (Charmaz, 2006).  
In order to claim the outcome to be theoretical, theory was defined. Positivist theory seeks 
causes, favors deterministic explanations, and emphasizes generality and universality; interpretive 
theory calls for the imaginative understanding of the studied phenomenon (Charmaz, 2006, p. 126). 
The contribution of this research could not offer generic deterministic theory of project management, as 
it was only based on one case study. However, it proposed a subjective conceptualized theoretical 
explication of the premises investigated in Copenhagen Suborbitals. Thus, the theoretical outcome of 
this research was defined interpretive rather than positivistic. 
Research Method 
Grounded theory is a methodology that allows thorough examination of a subject, with the least 
possible biased position.  The core philosophy is pragmatism, as grounded theory was originally 
founded to help researchers understand complex situations, in a practical manner (Suddaby, 2006). It 
contrasts common research approaches where preset hypotheses are tested throughout the study. 
Theory grounded in data is more likely to predict and explicate the subject, rather than a theory 
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generated by traditional deduction (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). “Grounded theory methods foster seeing 
your data in fresh ways and exploring your ideas about the data through early analytic writing” 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 2). Consequently, grounded theory methodology offered an opportunity to 
contribute with something unique and special to the engineering management community.  
Data Collection 
Everything experienced during the research was considered as data, as all impressions 
contributed to the construction and interpretation of meaning. The following qualitative methods were 
used: Observations, interviews, a blog, articles and internal documents. Primary source data collections 
are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
# Date Location Method Subject Duration [min] 
1 11.11.14 CS workshop Conversation Mads Wilson (MW) 40 
2 17.11.14 CS workshop Observation CS members 100 
3 17.11.14 CS workshop Semi-structured Mads Wilson (MW) 60 
4 21.11.14 Meeting room Observation CS members 135 
5 21.11.14 Meeting room Conversation Claus Mejling (CM) 30 
6 24.11.14 CS workshop Observation CS members 90 
7 24.11.14 CS workshop Semi-structured Kristian Sørensen (KS) 130 
8 25.11.14 DTU Observation CS- /CSS members 150 
9 15.12.14 CS workshop Observation CS members 90 
10 02.02.15 CS workshop Observation CS members 70 
11 02.02.15 CS workshop Semi-structured Kristian Sørensen (KS) 50 
 
Total hours: 15 h 45 min 
Table 1. Primary source (PS#) data collections 
Observations were performed at meetings and hanging around members, and thus participants 
were observed in their own environment, and were affected least possible. Interviews were divided in 
two forms: semi-structured and conversations. Semi-structured interviews had few open-ended 
questions that invited the participant to elaborate in own choice of direction. Conversations were 
completely non-planned and unstructured. 
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The most significant secondary source was the CS web-blog, adding up to around 650 unique 
posts. It was an important source of background information, and the foundation for the story section. 
A critic view on the blog was attained since it was personal and had PR incentives, questioning its 
credibility. Therefore, the blog was not used in the analysis. 
Analysis Approach 
Following is a review of the performed techniques and analytical process. 
Coding and Memoing. 
Open coding of data started with the data collection. It was important to keep a receptive mind, 
and continuously I asked myself: What does the data really mean? Data reports were ordered in initial 
codes where single words, quotes, or sentences were separated. The following codes are from the 
primary data collection: “Conflicts have vigorously been reduced due to better communication” and, 
“Sometimes we did not find out before Peter wrote it in his blog.” Later, they were connected to other 
codes like: “Right now no-one really dares to slam the table” and, “Members constantly seek 
consensus.” Consequently, these connections evolved into the following focused code (remember that 
this is uncorrected material): 
“The many conflicts in CS is now a part of the new shaping, and many of the initiatives are 
done to avoid conflicts. No one really dares (or wants) to slam the table in discussion. The 
tone is kept low, and most solutions are found in some kind of consensus. In general, the 
concept consensus is used all the time, and sometimes it causes that discussion are dragged 
for a long time, and maybe not solved. According to KS, all the initiative on communication 
has reduced the conflicts critically, especially the part about informing about processes of the 
respective groups. KS often acts as a mediator and regulator to avoid any confrontation of 
interest between groups. He says that he has to remind them to be informative. Often they did 
not know what was going on before they read it in the blog. ‘The internal communication was 
that bad’ MW.” 
Focused codes were descriptive paraphrases of interconnected codes based on data; and were not 
subject to rationalization, as this would contradict the production of pure data. When data was mature 
and had evolved into paraphrases and sections of data, the different parts were ordered and clustered 
into portions of data within the same category.  
Categories 
Categories explicated a larger portion of connected data, and for the first time gave an overview 
of the findings. In Table 2, categories and focused codes are presented. This table illustrates a phase 
late in the research, where categories were well established and focused codes mature.  
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Table 2 
 Categories 
Steering Resources Communication Motivation Stakeholders 
Fo
cu
se
d 
co
de
s 
Structure Human resources Meetings 
Incentive to 
change External 
Decisions Economy Internal communication Volunteers Internal 
Direction Materials Conflicts Involvement PR 
Coordination  Social feeling Motivation of CSS The blog 
Inspiration     
External 
communication 
Navigation     
Group forming     
Table 2. Data categories. Color code was used as a technique to visibly connect codes in the data.  
Data collection stopped when nothing new was evidenced. According to Charmaz (2006, p. 113), 
“grounded theorists should stop when categories are ‘saturated’.” With theoretical sampling, the data 
was narrowed down to a few categories for further refinement. As seen in Table 2, steering had most 
focused codes connected, hence it was chosen for further analysis. 
Theoretical Coding and Contribution. 
With a much narrower data perspective, the research went into a phase of deeper analysis and 
development of theories. Theoretical coding connected the focused codes, and with use of memoing it 
formed an increasingly detailed clarification of the subject. Consequently, the analysis formed into a 
deeper explication of CS, and eventually constituted an abstract contribution.  
Limitations 
Following are the limitations identified in the study. 
• Methodology 
o A bifurcation in the philosophical foundation of grounded theory methodology parts 
researchers; positivists on one side and constructivists on the other. Nonetheless, the 
limitation here was to accept either philosophy, possibly narrowing the acceptance of the 
research. 
o Grounded theory was unknown to me prior to the dissertation; thus, it required an extensive 
methodology investigation before and during the research.  
• Data 
o The data came from a single case study, thus the generic appliance and the discussion was 
naturally less reliable in universal context. A generically stronger contribution would have 
been based on more organizations, and thus grounded the theory in more data.  
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o The research participants were busy people with full time jobs, which occasionally 
prohibited data collection.  
o Data was collected in Danish, yet the paper developed in English. This caused linguistic 
interpretation of all data, and a risk of points getting lost in translation. 
• Time 
o The research period was limited by the thesis due date. Grounded theory did not consider 
this, and was a time consuming methodology, steered by data.  
o Data was not transcribed, due to the time limit. Transcriptions might have developed more 
data than reviews did.  
STORY 
In 2008, two men met in the hull of a submarine. Their dream was to travel into space in a 
homemade rocket, and return to earth safely – proving that rocket science was not only entitled NASA 
and other governmental organizations. They did not know whether it was possible, they did not know 
how much money they would need or if they would ever succeed. Nonetheless, they agreed to work 
together on this dream; a project most people would have discarded immediately because it seemed 
impossible.  
Peter Madsen and Kristian von Bengtson were both regarded as men with passion and with 
personalities that did not take no for an answer. They founded Copenhagen Suborbitals (CS), as a non-
profit space association based on volunteer workers. There was immediate attention from the media, as 
Madsen and Bengtson quickly had a small rocket engine ready for a first test. Unlike NASA and other 
governmental space programs, CS was based on cheap materials and simple technology. The concept 
was that space technology did not require governmental budgets, if they were creative enough. Rocket 
science was not rocket science anymore, and did not necessarily require the brightest minds on the 
planet; just dedication, hard work, and persistency. An example of simple technology was evidenced by 
the failure of the test rocket HEAT 1X in 2010, which never got off the platform due to a frozen valve, 
which should have been heated by a regular, low price, hair dryer. 
To most people this space mission might sound optimistic and foolish. However, it also 
stimulated dreams and science passion, and people, especially engineers, started to join the project. CS 
accelerated when a blog was initiated at ingeniøren.dk, a Danish engineering magazine. The interest 
exploded, and engineers from entire Denmark would comment, give advice and help acquiring 
materials. However, raising money was an ongoing topic, and CS was always in economic trouble. 
Several times, they announced to be in danger of shutting down. Therefore, in 2010, fans established a 
support organization that through memberships, raised money for the program. Throughout the history 
of CS, the supporters donated up to EUR 13.500 every month.  
CS was always trying to be active, and donations were instantly used for research and 
development. Especially one of the founders, Madsen, was always testing and experimenting many 
different things, new engines, new fuel, etc. Fans were frustrated that Madsen constantly changed the 
technology, instead of being consistent. A bifurcation started within the organization; some wanted to 
plan and develop well-known technology, and some wanted to experiment with novel technology. 
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Madsen claimed that theory, calculations, and rigid planning were not right for CS. He promoted 
practical solutions, and learning from mistakes. 
In 2011, CS successfully launched the HEAT 1X rocket, a pioneer in amateur rocket science, 
being about 500 times bigger than most amateur rockets. The launch was a gigantic success in CS, and 
an existential acknowledgement to the members. By the end of 2013, there were just under a thousand 
members in the support group, and almost 50 active members in CS. Even though everything appeared 
successful, internal issues had started to shine through the blog, and the social atmosphere was tense. 
The program had grown to a size that challenged the structure and the founders, and with the increasing 
number of supporters and fans, they had an increasing number of stakeholders to please. There were 
internal disagreements about the association, the economy, and technology. Hard working members 
had earned the right to make decisions; however, the founders still had the last word. Madsen, being 
very tempered, had outbursts against Bengtson or other members when they disagreed. In the beginning 
of 2014, a dispute resulted in Bengtson leaving CS. Soon after, a board was elected to take care of the 
conflicts, and ensure survival of the association. CS was on shaky ground, and in the beginning of June 
the static test of HEAT 2X, the biggest in history, failed. After months of hard work, it was a hard blow 
to the members and a setback of the association. From here, the internal conflicts escalated, and the 
chemistry between Madsen and the other members was at a boiling point. This resulted in Madsen 
leaving.  
Copenhagen Suborbitals had the challenge of proving that they could proceed without the 
founders, with a new board and new organization. The situation with the economy was serious, and the 
board wanted to make economic sanitation, reducing the number of expensive side projects. Via the 
blog, fans were told about all the members that had been hidden behind Madsen and Bengtson’s ego for 
many years. Even though the founders were gone, it was the same dream, with almost 50 skilled and 
passionate people. What the board emphasized was the importance of all members, and that they were 
all equal parts of CS. The members did not want hierarchy, but unity. 
ANALYSIS 
The present chapter and analysis is based on the data from primary sources, thus grounded in 
Copenhagen Suborbitals; it takes off apparently where the story section ends. The analysis has two 
contributions: Organizational balance and operational processes.  
Organizational Balance 
As there were no intentions going into the research, it was unknown what the focus would be. 
As rocket science is generally perceived as difficult, it was a surprising experience that the 
development of technology itself was relatively unproblematic. The issues, both observed and stated by 
participants, related to management and steering. 
The research discovered that CS recently had changed their internal organization. The 
organization was now without individualistic profiles, and the ownership and power was given to the 
remaining members. The newly selected board had the important mission of reducing conflicts and 
ensuring the association’s future. After both founders had left CS, the board introduced an egalitarian 
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model that rejected hierarchy and had completely decentralized power structures. A significant finding 
was that neither the board nor the chairman had executive power, but only did what they were expected 
to do: To bring order and ensure the future. Evidently, this created member unity and an environment 
of consensus with increased communication, a good social atmosphere, and - unlike in the past, 
carefully thought through decisions. However, the environment of extreme consensus was not exactly 
utopia. The extreme consensus meant slow decisions and complicated procedures, which evidently 
were unproductive. Meanwhile, CS was organized in few, over-populated groups with unspecific focus 
areas, which disabled members to take initiative and create activity.  
CS members were aware of this problem; consensus was a vital part of their organization, 
however, concurrently it disabled them to produce rockets. During the research, a new initiative in the 
organizational form was initiated. By clarifying technological areas, more groups emerged, and 
members were scattered into smaller groupings. Members were liberated to join the groups they found 
interesting, which caused groups to have competent and engaged members. Conclusively, this initiative 
caused groups to have more specific work areas, and fewer and competent members. This development 
had a significant effect on the productivity. The reason hereof was that members had now had 
individual space and took initiative within their field, and because there were fewer members present, 
group consensus was simple. Nonetheless, the core of CS was still based on collectivity and broad 
consensus, and as such the small organization operated in two levels, the collective and the individual.  
The data suggested a balance between consensus and initiative. Consensus promoted unity, 
increased social factors, and reduced conflicts; it also caused substantial decisions, defined as 
effectivity. However, too much consensus was inefficient and extremely time consuming. The 
opposing force was initiative, which created activity and efficiency; however, it also implied quick 
decisions and individualism, and eventually it could lead to conflicts. In Figure 1, the balance-
relationship in CS is depicted.  
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Figure 1. Balance model - illustrates the connection of consensus and initiative 
The organization was in a state where the collective was united, there was good communication, 
and decisions were made in consensus. Thus, from a steering/managerial point of view all members 
were involved in the executive coalition. However, members were also scattered in groups that 
individually were responsible for delivering different rocket parts, and these groups enabled initiative 
and action. Balancing the concepts of consensus and initiative showed to be most productive – 
decisions were agreed upon by the collective and initiated by the individual. 
Operational Processes 
So, how did this organizational form operate? The operation consisted of two significant 
processes: Direction and navigation. The analysis of these processes reveals how CS alters between 
consensus seeking and individual initiative.  
The term direction was mentioned by a source in an interview, and was found to be an 
appropriate term. It meant the development of a non-fixed course with approximately the right 
specifications, whilst identifying important activities. This was a new initiative in CS, and a source 
explained, “It has increasingly occurred to us how important a base plan is.” However, the direction 
had to remain flexible due to uncertainties with materials, member presence, and technology 
development. A few terms affected the forming of direction. The board had responsibility of the 
economy and was thus allowed to steer the budget. This notion was supported by a source stating that, 
“we have solid steering on budgets, because we do not have a lot of money.” Furthermore, CS had a 
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responsibility to the volunteer donators, “We know that we have to deliver the goods, and make sure 
that donations are used right.” Consequently, economy and showing progress to donators were terms of 
the direction. 
With the terms in mind, the collective group shaped a macro direction with a long-term overall 
perspective. The macro direction was undetailed and flexible, and the most important aspect was to 
create mutual expectations that limited hasty individual decisions. The macro direction was a collective 
activity and based on consensus seeking by all members; it was the most complicated consensus-
dominated process in the research, however an important activity to maintain the unity and equality.   
Micro direction, however, was a group activity, where the individual groups had to plan within 
their own area. Creating a micro direction was about assessing the technology and the tasks within the 
frame and collective expectations of the macro direction. As an individual group activity, it was not 
dominated by broad consensus, but a responsibility of the local group members. Accordingly, micro 
direction was shaped by individual initiative and simple local consensus seeking, and was observed to 
be relatively productive. In Figure 2, a simple model demonstrates the formation of macro- and micro 
direction.  
 
 
Figure 2. The direction process – Ingoing terms and iteration process of macro- and micro direction. 
As shown in the model, the process of making direction was highly dynamic, and observed as 
an ongoing iterative process between the micro and macro level. Thus, the direction formation was 
balanced between consensus and initiative, and as seen in Figure 1 – the balance model, it implied 
productivity. 
The iterative process of direction created an increasingly clear plan both at the collective and 
individual level. When the direction was clear enough, and both the collective and individual plans 
were in agreement, CS proceeded to navigational processes, concerned with following the direction. 
During navigation, groups had freedom with responsibility and were self-controlled. According to a 
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source, “Groups can steer themselves, as long as it doesn’t affect the others (groups).” Hence 
navigation and production in CS were delegated to the groups, and implied initiative and activity. 
However, in order for the collective to follow the development, one of the most important elements in 
navigation was that groups were obligated to be informative about their process and development. This 
is were the operation went back to consensus seeking, to ensure that everything was in order and 
followed the right trail of development and expectations. With information from groups, the collective 
evaluated the current development and position in comparison to the direction. Evaluation in 
collectivity either resulted in direct feedback to individual groups or caused the organization to re-
assess the direction and the underlying norms of their development. The following Figure 3 depicts a 
model illustrating the navigation.  
 
 
Figure 3. Navigation process – self-controlled groups inform the collective, which evaluates the situation, leading 
to either feedback and coordination, or a re-assessment of the direction.  
As seen in the model, self-controlling groups, based on initiative, informed the collective, 
which evaluated the situation and compared the different groups development. This resulted in direct 
feedback or re-assessment of the direction. In this model, CS used the balance of initiative and 
consensus to navigate towards a united goal by allowing individual activity. As with the direction, the 
navigation had a high use of iterations between the collective and the individual groups. Practically, 
each group worked with their technology, seeking to develop a good solution within their field. 
Concurrently, different developments were presented and tested, and if successful the group would 
proceed, if not, it would try something alternative.  
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Conclusive Remarks on Analysis 
The research and analysis of the organizational form suggested that CS were organized in two 
levels and despite of lack of chiefs, achieved to execute steering based on consensus and equality. 
However, to ensure productivity the association delegated the responsibility for activity and production 
to the initiative of the group members. This form was based on the balance of consensus and initiative. 
The organizational arrangement became visible in the operation, where both in the direction formation 
and in navigation, consensus and initiative were vital parts of the process. The operation was based on 
iterations and concurrent research and development. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Project management is defined as, “The application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques 
to project activities to meet the project requirements” (PMI, 2008, p. 4), in order to meet the constraints 
of scope, time, and cost (Hällgren & Söderholm, 2010; Lenfle & Loch 2010). Standards suggest a 
solution to contingencies in projects, by introducing risk management, which is the application of 
“probabilities times the impact” (Pich et al., 2002, p. 1009). There seems to be a bifurcation in the 
field; on one side there is numerous project management standards with positivistic approach to 
contingency, and on the other side researchers claim that contingencies cannot be foreseen or predicted, 
especially those of social character (Ghoshal, 2005; Morris, 2013). “There is no scientific basis on 
which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know” (Keynes, 1937, p. 211). 
McFarlan (1981) argues that in uncertain and ambiguous projects, tight planning and control only gives 
the manger an idea of having control, when in reality they do not. This is supported by Morris (2013) 
and Söderlund (2002), highlighting that standards present unpredictable variables in positivistic 
theories.  
Standard planning measures are only successfully applicable when an adequate level of 
information is present (Pich et al., 2002). There do exist methods suited for contingency management 
and complex development; trial-and-error learning and parallel trails (Lenfle & Loch, 2010; Pich et al., 
2002; Sommer & Loch, 2004). Both methods originated in complex and uncertain projects in USA 
around the 1950s - before the project management institutionalization around the 1970s (Lenfle & 
Loch, 2010). The trial-and-error learning method implies experimentation and iterative development of 
knowledge, and is associated with innovation and single- and double loop learning (Lenfle, 2008; 
Mintzberg, 2014). Double-loop learning enables the institution to, not only redirect their current path, 
but to revise the underlying strategic norms (Argyris & Schön, 1983). Trial-and-error methods allow 
projects to become strategy tools, rather than strategy fulfillers, as ongoing development allow 
managers to change and adapt the underlying norms and not only the project development (Lenfle & 
Loch, 2010). Developing parallel trials involves the development of several design proposals, in order 
to increase the likelihood to develop at least one successful design (Lenfle & Loch, 2010). Neither of 
the methods are found in the standards, as they are conflicting many of the standardized beliefs 
concerned with scope, cost and time.  
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Lenfle and Loch (2010) claim that modern practice has lost its roots, and that project 
management standards favor cost/performance relationship instead of the optimal solution. 
Furthermore, they accuse the standards of being obsessed with “execution” and “uncertainty 
elimination and control” (p. 48). Morris (2013) agrees with this by stating that project management has 
to focus on delivering the adequate output, not solely on constraints of cost, budget and scope. 
Contemporary standards use a phased approach of controlled sequential stages; thus, projects are 
managed on calculations rather than possibilities, causing free innovation and new ideas to be limited 
(Lenfle & Loch, 2010). Kreiner (1992) supports this, and argues that projects in organizations should 
be releasing creative forces instead of planning, and increase people participation instead of control. 
The result hereof, is that the art of project management has placed itself in a niche of top-down 
perspectives, where innovation and strategy formation are under-prioritized (Blomquist, Hällgren, 
Nilsson & Söderholm, 2010; Cicmil, Williams, Thomas, & Hodgson, 2006; Hällgren & Söderholm, 
2010, Lenfle & Loch, 2010; Pich et al., 2002). Ghoshal (2005) argues that excessive use of 
assumptions and partial empirical analysis has created imperfect positivistic theories that are destroying 
good practice. Organizations that use iteration and parallel methods are often novel, or in a complex 
and dynamic environment, and perceived as unprofessional and poorly managed, because their 
techniques are situated “outside” (Lenfle & Loch, 2010, p. 47) of best practice (Aiken & Hage, 1971; 
Van de Ven 1986).  
However, research in the last decade has shown that trial-and-error and parallel trial is a viable 
method of managing novelty, especially when “unforeseeable uncertainty” is high (Loch, Solt, & 
Bailey, 2008, p. 33). When managing technology and innovation with high risk, management should 
acknowledge the uncertainty and expect situational variables; thus, methods should differ from 
standardized measures (Lenfle, 2008; Lenfle & Loch, 2010; Loch et al., 2008; McFarlan, 1981; 
Mintzberg, 2014; Pich et al., 2002; Van de Ven, 1986). Conclusively, project management should 
emphasize both standard- and specific measures, by then optimizing when possible, but not neglecting 
to have a specific focus on context and contingency (Besner & Hobbs, 2008; Hällgren & Söderholm, 
2010; Söderlund, 2004). 
DISCUSSION 
This research was performed at Department of Management Engineering at DTU; thus, there 
was an underlying expectation of finding something with academic interest within this area. Grounded 
theory is steered by data, which did not indicate much about management. From the first conversation, 
sources were talking about CS’ lack of project management; they neither had managers nor any interest 
in processes related to project management - it is an amusing finding that an amateur rocket 
manufacturer has more problems with managing the workforces than actually creating rockets. During 
the literature review – after the analysis, I read the article by Lenfle and Loch (2010) concerning 
project management having forgot its roots, and how standards only offer positivistic response to 
contingencies. Lenfle and Loch specifically notice two neglected methods that they argue should be 
part of modern project management; trial-and-error and parallel trials. The message in the article struck 
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me like a lightning, as I suddenly realized that CS was using exactly these methods - without having 
established project management, and without being aware of it. The alternative processes found in the 
analysis – direction and navigation, had strong connections to trial-and-error and parallel trails, and 
almost everything CS did was done by iterations and learning circles. They had been using original 
project management methods right in front of me, although claiming to reject it. This suggests the 
methods and processes to be intuitively applied by CS, and the fact that they worked with complex and 
unpredictable technology, while applying the same methods that Lenfle and Loch suggest to viable in 
these situations, becomes a strong argument for the context of this research.  
Before going into a discussion about the findings, there is an interesting point here. I, as a 
researcher, have been educated in project management, but obviously did not identify the connection to 
CS’ methods, during the data collection. Similarly, participants did not make the connection either. 
This exposes how these methods are not perceived as viable to manage projects, but more as 
alternatives in the absence of standards. An answer to why these methods are not commonly 
understood as feasible might lie in the common obsession of scope, cost, and time, taught at university. 
As a grounded theorist researcher with constructivist philosophy, this is an interesting point. The 
argument is that trial-and-error and parallel trails are costly methods; doing it right the first time, and 
doing it once, is profitable – it is as simple as that. Lenfle and Loch argue that our search to know 
everything has caused us to standardize, and deny that some things cannot be foreseen. Hence, we have 
forgotten to appreciate methods that allow us to learn by doing, and experiment with different 
solutions. In the study of CS, members seemed embarrassed when stating that they did not perform 
proper management, because their comprehension of project management was similar to standards. 
Conclusively, neither my sources nor I identified CS’ apparent connection to project management, 
which support the contemporary literature claim that best practice neglects these original methods. As 
stated earlier, it was acknowledged that my background might influence the research, and when I did 
not recognize project management, it suggests that my perception of the discipline was locked on other 
methods; most likely concerned with scope, cost, and time. The fact that I did not recognize, and yet 
the analysis were supportive of contemporary claims, suggest the analysis to be pure. Luckily, this turn 
of event contextualized the contribution, and enabled an interesting discussion about project 
management. After all grounded theorists do need good luck sometimes (Suddaby, 2006). 
The organizational form in CS is unconventional; CS rejected individual authority and the 
existence of floor managers, and instead they operated in a switching state of collectivity and delegated 
individualism. By balancing consensus and initiative in this form, CS had arranged a steering form for 
practicing rocket science without having rigid organizational structure, specialized positions, or 
executive managers. This form creates unity and equality, while still allowing each member to 
contribute and take action in the production. The surprising thing with the organizational part, might be 
the aspect that consensus both saves the organization from individualism and conflicts, and endangers 
the production with extremely slow pace. Thus, in this research, consensus is not a utopia of agreement, 
but a dangerous state if it becomes too extreme. Likewise, initiative has similar affect: No initiative 
cause no activity, and too much initiative endangers the state of equality and unity of the members. 
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Thus, this research suggests a balance of initiative and consensus in order achieve optimal production, 
in an organization like CS.  
The operational processes identified in the analysis connect to known methods that often imply 
innovation and development – like double-loop learning. If the development of technology and rocket 
parts showed to be unfulfilling or faulty, CS had two responses; they navigated around it, or they 
looped back to the direction formation and changed the expectations and underlying norms of 
development. Remember from the analysis how the direction was flexible because adjustments were 
expected. Thus, in CS failures were not necessarily a bad thing, but an opportunity to learn and adapt. 
Consequently, building rockets were done in iterative development and constant adjustment of strategy. 
CS managed to use both consensus and initiative in the operation; this evidently had great 
effect. This is depicted in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Compare of balance model and trial-and-error process 
• On the left upper corner in the model is the collective activity, which is placed in the top of the 
balance model. Here the focus is broad consensus and organizational unity. During operation the 
collective made evaluations, coordinated, and ensured right decisions. 
• Between the collective and groups is a critic link – the information obligation. This ensures that 
development of rocket parts are known to all members. 
• Groups are depicted below the collective, on the left-middle side of the model. Here reside 
competent members, initiative, and simpler agreement due to few members engaged. The groups 
have both initiative and consensus, depicted by the doted line through the middle of the balance 
model. Consequently, groups had relatively high activity and development. 
• CS as a whole is a blend of these collective and individual activities, and as an organization is 
situated between these levels in the balance model.  
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Subsequently to the analysis, I realized that the actual operation never changed in CS, and the 
development had always been based on trial-and-error. Evidenced through the blog, they started out by 
making the simplest technology they could come up with; remember how a dysfunctional hair dryer 
was the reason for an unsuccessful launch of HEAT 1X back in 2010. Peter Madsen (2014) once wrote 
in a blog, “Accept calculated risc [sic], you will eventually die anyway´,” addressing the essence in CS. 
Since the beginning, they had been accepting risks and the possibility of failure. The technology in CS 
had become more complex, and according to sources, this progress was expected in CS. They always 
knew that simple was not enough, they just had to start with simple. In an innovative organization like 
CS, the knowledge and complexity will keep growing until it reaches its final destination, whether it 
ends above the Karman line or a huge explosion in Copenhagen Harbor. 
Acknowledged, CS is a special case study and the theoretical outcome is not generically 
applicable. For instance the balance model would probably scale differently in comparison of other 
cases, or even look completely differently. However, I do argue that the study supports the literature 
about lost roots in project management, and the need for adopting integrating practices. CS was using 
trial-and-error and double-loop learning intuitively, probably because it is good sense in their 
environment with complex technology and contingent propositions. Perhaps modern project 
management needs more intuition? Rather, complex projects in contingent environments will either fail 
or apply specific measures to cope with its proposition. The advantage of standardized methods should 
not be rejected, especially in organizations with standardized quantitative production. Of course, 
companies can stay innovative while standardizing some processes, and NASA, just to stay within the 
subject of rocket science, has a whole department standardizing their processes. Hence, NASA 
manages to balance outside- and inside-the-box thinking. Whether it is pure coincidence or it has a 
deeper explanation, it is a fascinating discovery that this study has been connecting a non-profit and 
voluntary space program, with some of the original project management methods that NASA 
developed their program on, in the space race in the 1950s. Conclusively, institutions will find a way to 
manage their operation, whether methods are standardized by professional organizations, or intuitively 
developed, to fit the proposition. Moreover, institutions can only claim to reject project management, 
because project management has been standardized to meet specific constraints. Everything performed 
in a project matter is the appliance of management.  
This discussion has focused on the application of intuitive methods in managing projects. If the 
definition of project management is “The application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to 
project activities to meet the project requirements,” as PMI has stated, then there should not be a blind 
devotion to standards, but focus on applying adequate methods that meet the constraints of the 
respective situation. Members of CS seemed embarrassed when acknowledging that they did not apply 
standardized methods of management. I state, in contrary, that they should be proud of their intuitive 
methods and acknowledge that their situation as hobby-organization is special. Special situations might 
require special methods. Conclusively, the intuitive methods found in the analysis of CS, are actually 
encouraged by contemporary researchers in project management practice. The takeaway from this 
research is that a small organization that rejected executive leaders and hierarchy, were still able attain 
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a steering coalition by involving all members in broad consensus. It was also successful in avoiding 
unproductiveness of consensus by delegating production to competent members in small self-forming 
groups. So far the organizational form has been a success, however, it is still new and any further 
development in CS will be exciting to follow. Another takeaway is the context to project management, 
and the support of contemporary literature. By intuition CS used the proposed methods of trial-and-
error and parallel trail, uncertain situations were handled with learning and adaption, which suggests 
that these methods might be viable, and should be accepted in project management practice.  
Robustness of Research  
The final section features a brief discussion of biased position in terms of preconceived 
knowledge, data interpretation, influenced sources, and methodological techniques.   
According to Loosemore and Tan (2000), a researcher’s stereotype perceptions cause ignorance 
or misinterpretation of data. Being a student/researcher of engineering management constituted a 
natural risk hereof; however, measures and conscious choices were made to limit preconceived 
influence. Firstly, all literature review was delayed until after the analysis, which limited the risk of 
direct academic prejudice. Secondly, by constantly reminding myself to preserve a receptive mind and 
listen to the data, I argue to have limited the influence of my knowledge, or at least stayed open to 
findings. Evidence of receptiveness is found in the central discussion about alternative methods of 
project management. Sources stated that CS did practice project management, which actually helped 
me to think: OK, then what are the alternatives? As a consequence hereof, the data collection and 
analysis emphasized the data and the research displayed the alternative methods: Direction and 
navigation. Conclusively, by delaying literature and maintaining a receptive position, I claim that 
influence from preexisting knowledge was limited.  
It was previously described how interview questions were open-ended and non-judgmental.  
However, asking neutral questions in an interview did not guarantee that the interview actually was 
neutral (Charmaz, 2006). There was a risk of my origin alone influencing the research participants, 
causing them to act unnatural and answer in favor of themselves or me. To limit this risk, minimum 
was told to participants about my origin and the thesis; however, participants were aware that I was 
from DTU. I noticed how some participants seemed to underline how they really did not have project 
management, which, I assume, was because of my origin. This risk was limited most possible; 
however, the effect of it is difficult to evaluate. Approaching the end of the study, the analytical 
findings were presented to a source. He was positive to the findings and found them viable to explain 
the behavior in CS. However, even though a source was positive to the findings, it did not necessarily 
suggest all data to be valid. I argue that the subject itself will have difficulties to both accept and reject 
a study, as the subject will always have a biased position.  
According to Charmaz (2006), grounded theorists have to follow the rules and guidelines in 
order to rightfully claim to have used the method. I argue to have shown my devotion to the techniques 
and rules of grounded theory, and by best my abilities distanced from the obvious pitfalls of biased data 
production.  
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CONCLUSION 
This paper offers a study with grounded theory in an unusual association. Grounded in the data, 
the analysis contributes with a balance model, suggesting initiative and consensus to be two opposing 
concepts, both vital to the subject. Using these concepts, the subject successfully decentralized their 
structure, and rejected all hierarchy. This created a form where the executive coalition is collective. 
Essentially, consensus promotes unity and agreement, and initiative creates individualism and activity, 
and the study suggests a balance to be optimal. The subject claimed to reject project management and 
the existence of managers, and the analysis identified alternative processes that combined consensus 
and initiative. Interestingly, the study shows that even though the subject claimed to reject project 
management, it was in fact using the same methods that contemporary literature states to be forgotten 
roots of the discipline. This supports the claim that project management standards are prohibited of 
alternative methods. The alternative methods identified with the subject, were highly congruent to 
methods of trial-and-error and parallel trails. Now, these were applied out of good sense, and not in 
relation to standardized project management. This suggests project management to use more intuitive 
methods in similar, and support claims that these methods should be accepted as viable in the practice.  
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